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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, a new fair certified email protocol is proposed. The proposed protocol uses offline trusted third party (TTP) 
that will only be involved if a party misbehaves, otherwise the TTP is inactive. The protocol is based on the verifiable and 
recoverable encryption of keys. In this regard, the recipient of an email will be able to verify if the encrypted key used to 
encrypt the email is correct. The protocol comprises of only three messages in the exchange sub-protocol and three 
messages in the recovery sub-protocol. The proposed protocol is more efficient compared with related protocols. 
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1. Introduction  
Alice would like to send an electronic mail (email) to Bob and she needs to receive an evidence of receipt from Bob. To 
provide this service, certified email protocols are used. As in certified postal mail where the postman delivers the mail and 
asks the recipient to sign a receipt. In the certified email protocols, the items to be exchanged between the sender and the 
recipient are the email and the evidence of receipt. If the recipient receives the email and the sender receives the 
evidence of receipt then fairness is ensured for all parties. 
The evidence of receipt is called non-repudiation of receipt. It ensures that the recipient cannot deny receiving the email. 
Some certified email protocols provide evidence called non-repudiation of origin which ensures that the sender cannot 
deny sending the email. Non-repudiation of origin is optional in certified email protocols [7]. 
Fair certified email protocols are like other fair exchange protocols using which two parties exchange their items in a fair 
manner (some protocols are designed to be used by more than two parties). That is, either both parties get each other 
items or none does.  
Early fair exchange protocols are not based on a Trusted Third Party (TTP) [5, 6, 8]. Parties using these protocols are 
gradually exchanging their items in parts until the whole items are exchanged between the two parties. These protocols 
assume that the two parties have the same computational power. Additionally, the number of rounds needed to complete 
the exchange can be high. 
TTP is involved in other fair exchange protocols to overcome the problems with protocols that do not involve a TTP. The 
involvement of the TTP can be inline, online or offline. The inline TTP is used to deliver the exchanged items between 
parties [3]. The sender sends the email to the TTP. The TTP encrypts the email and sends it to the recipient. The recipient 
signs the receipt and sends it to the TTP. Finally, the TTP forwards the decryption key to the recipient to decrypt the email 
and the receipt to the sender. Fairness is ensured but the problem with this approach is that the TTP is heavily involved in 
the exchange of items because the TTP is used to deliver the items to the parties. 
To reduce the involvement of the inline TTP, the online TTP is introduced. The online TTP is used during the protocol 
execution but its use is not for delivering the items. An example of the use of online TTP is for validating items [2]. 
Therefore, the online TTP-based protocols reduced the load on the TTP but the problem is that it needs to be active during 
the exchange of items.  
To overcome the problems of inline and online TTP-based protocols, the offline TTP-based protocols are introduced [1, 9, 
10, 11, 12, 15]. The offline TTP is not used in the normal execution of the protocol. It is going to be used if something goes 
wrong during the exchange of items such as one party misbehaves. The offline TTP-based protocols are the best among 
the TTP-based protocols because the use of the TTP is kept to minimum and hence the cost of running a TTP is reduced. 
Additionally, the problem of having the TTP as a source of bottleneck is reduced in the offline TTP-based protocols. 
Micali [9] proposed a certified email protocol. Micali's protocol consists of two sub-protocols; the exchange sub-protocol 
consists of three messages and the dispute resolution sub-protocol consists of three messages. The exchange sub-
protocol works as follows. Alice sends the first message that includes the email encrypted with Bob's public key and the 
first message is encrypted with the TTP's public key. When Bob receives the first message, he signs it with his private key. 
If Alice finds the signed receipt is correct then she sends the email encrypted with Bob's public key. 
The dispute resolution sub-protocol of Micali's protocol works as follows. Bob sends to the TTP, (a) the encrypted email 
that he received from Alice, and (b) Bob's signature on the encrypted email. If the TTP finds Bob's signature is correct then 
the TTP will send Bob's signature to Alice and the encrypted email to Bob.  
Puigserver et al [15] proposed a certified email protocol. Their protocol works as follows. Alice sends the first message to 
Bob. The first message includes the encrypted email, the key used to encrypt the email encrypted with the public key of 
the TTP, commitment of Alice to finish the exchange. Once Bob receives the first message, he verifies it and if it is correct 
then he sends to Alice his commitment to finish the exchange. Then, Alice sends to Bob the decryption key encrypted with 
Alice's private key. Finally, Bob signs the received message from Alice to acknowledge the receipt of the message. If Bob 
fails to send his signature to Alice then she contacts the TTP to resolve the dispute.  
Another certified email protocol is proposed by Ninadic et al [12]. Their protocol is based on verifiable and recoverable 
encryption of signatures. Using this approach, a party is be able to verify whether or not the encrypted signature is correct 
and if yes then the party can send its item to the other party. If the other party fails to send their item then the TTP can 
recover their item. The protocol starts by Alice sending the following to Bob: her signature on the email, and encrypted 
email. On receiving Alice's message, Bob verifies it and if it is correct then he sends his signature on the encrypted email, 
and verifiable and recoverable encryption of signature. Alice then verifies Bob's message and if it is correct then she 
sends to Bob the decryption key to decrypt the email. Bob finally sends the decryption key to Alice to get Bob's signature. 
If Alice fails to get the decryption key from Bob then she contacts the TTP to recover the decryption key. 
In this paper, a new fair certified email protocol is proposed. The proposed protocol is based on verifiable and recoverable 
encryption of keys. Using this approach, a party will be able to verify if the encrypted key used to encrypt the email is 
correct. If it is correct then it is safe for them to release their signature on the email because if the other party fails to send 
the decryption key then the TTP will be able to recover it. Protocols that are based verifiable and recoverable encryption of 
signatures (such as in [12]) consist of four messages in the exchange sub-protocol, whereas our protocol consists of three 
messages. This is because the design of the protocols that are based on verifiable and recoverable encryption of 
signature is different in that the two parties firstly exchange the encrypted email for the verifiable and recoverable 
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encryption of signature. If all verifications are correct then the two parties exchange the decryption keys to decrypt the 
email and the signature of the recipient of the email (evidence of receipt). The design of our approach reduced the number 
of messages to only three messages as will be explained in the next section.  
2. The Proposed Protocol  
The proposed protocol consists of two sub-protocols, the exchange sub-protocol and the recovery sub-protocol. The 
normal execution of the protocol is executed in the exchange sub-protocol where the sender and the recipient of the email 
behave honestly. The recovery sub-protocol will be executed if one of the parties behaves dishonestly.  
The idea of the proposed protocol is as follows. Alice and Bob would like to exchange an email for a receipt. To start the 
protocol, Alice sends the encrypted email to Bob. Bob will be able to verify the encrypted email using special certificates 
(M-Cert and C.at that will be discussed in the Notations section). If the encrypted email is correct then Bob will send the 
receipt to Alice. Finally, Alice sends the decryption key to Bob to get the email. If Alice fails to send the decryption key to 
Bob then Bob contact the TTP to recover it. 
In this approach, Alice is enforced to be honest by enforcing her to send a correct encrypted email to get the receipt. If the 
encrypted email is incorrect then Bob will not send the receipt. Therefore, Alice has to send the correct encrypted email. 
The proposed protocol is based on the following assumptions: 
 All parties will use the same encryption, decryption and hash algorithms  
 Communication channels are resilient, meaning that all sent messages will be received by their intended 
receivers  
 Necessary timestamps are used in related messages to prevent the replay attacks  
 Identifiers will be used to identify the sender and the receiver of the messages. For simplicity they are omitted 
from the protocol messages  
2.1 Notations 
The following represents the notations used in the proposed protocol. 
 Pa, Pb, and Pt: parties Alice, Bob, and TTP, respectively. 
 C.at: the shared public key certificate between Pa and the TTP. The shared public key between Pa and TTP is 
denoted as pkat = (eat, nat) and its corresponding private key is denoted as skat = (dat, nat). The TTP will have a 
copy of skat. After creating the shared public key, the TTP will issue the certificate C.at of the shared public key 
and send it to Pa.  
 M: the email  
 M-Cert: the email's certificate. It is issued by Certificate Authority CA before the protocol starts. It includes the 
following: 
1. hM: hash value of the email 
2. heM: hash value of encrypted email with ka  
3. heKa: hash value of encrypted ka with pkat 
4. CA's signature on M-Cert 
 Ka: a symmetric key used by Pa 
 Pkx = (ex, nx): RSA Public Key [16] of the party x, where nx is a public RSA modulus and ex is a public exponent  
 Skx = (dx, nx): RSA Private Key [16] of the party x, where nx is a public RSA modulus and dx is a private exponent 
 h(M): a strong-collision-resistant one-way hash function 
 enc.pkx(M): an RSA [16] encryption of message M using the public key pkx (ex, nx). The encryption of M is 
computed as follows. enc.pkx(M) = M
ex
 mod nx 
 enc.skx(Z): an RSA [16] decryption of Z using the private key skx (dx, nx). The decryption of Z is computed as 
follows. enc.skx(Z) = Z
dx
 mod nx 
 Sig.x(M): the RSA digital signature [16] of the party x on M. The digital signature of party x on M is computed by 
encrypting the hash value of M using the private key skx (dx, nx). 
 Px → Py: M, means party x sends message M to party y 
 X + Y: concatenation of X and Y 
2.2 The Exchange Sub-Protocol  
 
Figure 1: The Exchange Sub-Protocol 
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The exchange sub-protocol consists of the following steps (messages) as shown in Fig. 1: 
1- Alice starts the exchange sub-protocol by sending to Bob the first message that includes the following items: the 
shared public key certificate (C.at), the email's certificate (M-Cert), and the email encrypted with ka, and the 
encryption of ka with shard public key pkat  
2- On receiving the first message, Bob will do the following verifications: 
a. Verify the correctness of both C.at and M-Cert by checking their signatures. 
b. Compute the hash value of "enc.ka(M)" then compare it with "heM" that is included in M-Cert 
c. Compute the hash value of "enc.pkat(ka)" then compare it with "heKa" that is included in M-Cert 
 
If all verifications are correct then Bob will send the second message to Alice. The second message includes 
Bob's signature on the encrypted email that was received in the first message. Bob's signature represents that 
Bob has received the email i.e. it is the non-repudiation of receipt 
3- Once Alice receives Bob's message, she will verify the signature. If the signature is correct then she will send the 
third message to Bob. The third message includes the shared private key to decrypt the encrypted email that was 
received by Bob in the first message.  
At this stage, Alice has received the receipt that confirms that Bob received the email. Also, Bob has received the email. 
Therefore, fairness is ensured. 
If Alice refuses to send the decryption key in the third message then Bob can request it from the TTP as will be described 
in the next section. 
2.3 The Recovery Sub-Protocol  
If Bob fails to receive the decryption key in the third message of the exchange sub-protocol, then he can raise a dispute to 
the TTP as follows (as shown in Fig. 2): 
 
 
Figure 2: The Recovery Sub-Protocol 
1- Bob sends the first message that he received from Alice in addition to Bob's signature on the encrypted email 
2- On receiving the first message, TTP will do the following verifications: 
a. Verify the correctness of both C.at and M-Cert by checking their signatures. 
b. Compute the hash value of "enc.ka(M)" then compare it with "heM" that is included in M-Cert 
c. Compute the hash value of "enc.pkat(ka)" then compare it with "heKa" that is included in M-Cert 
d. Verify Bob's signature on the encrypted email 
If all verifications are correct, then TTP will send Bob's signature on the encrypted email to Alice and the 
decryption key to Bob.  
The reason for sending Bob's signature to Alice is to ensure fairness for both parties as Bob may contact the TTP before 
sending his signature on the email to Alice. 
3. Discussion  
The following discusses the fairness and non-repudiation properties of the proposed protocol. 
Fairness: in the certified email protocols, fairness for both the sender and the recipient of the email need to be ensured 
i.e. either both get each other item or none does. That is, Bob receives the email and Alice receives a confirmation that 
Bob has received the email. 
Regarding the fairness property in the exchange sub-protocol, the following cases will be studied. 
1- Messages that Bob needs to receive from Alice to complete the exchange sub-protocol are EM1 and EM3:  
a. If Bob receives correct messages EM1 and EM3 and also Alice receives correct EM2 then fairness is 
ensured.  
b. If Bob receives EM1 but does not receive EM3 then if Bob does not send EM2 then fairness is not 
compromised because Alice does not receive Bob's signature on the email and also Alice does not send 
the decryption key to Bob.  
c. If Bob receives EM1 and sends correct EM2 to Alice but does not receive EM3 then fairness is not 
ensured and hence Bob needs to use the recovery sub-protocol to ensure fairness. 
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2- Message that Alice needs to receive from Bob to complete the exchange sub-protocol is EM2: 
a. If Alice receives incorrect EM2 then she will not send EM3 and fairness is ensured.  
b. If Alice receives correct EM2 and send correct EM3 to Bob then fairness is ensured.  
c. If Alice receives correct EM2 but does not send EM3 or sends incorrect EM3 then fairness is not 
ensured and hence Bob needs to use the recovery sub-protocol to ensure fairness.  
Regarding the fairness property in the recovery sub-protocol, the following cases will be studied. 
1- Message that Bob needs to receive from TTP to complete the recovery sub-protocol is DR-M3: 
a. If the TTP receives correct DR-M1 from Bob then TTP will send DR-M3 to Bob.  
b. If the TTP receives incorrect DR-M1 from Bob then the TTP will not send DR-M3. Therefore, to ensure 
fairness Bob needs to send correct DR-M1 to TTP. 
2- Message that Alice needs to receive from TTP to complete the recovery sub-protocol is DR-M2:  
a. If the TTP receives correct DR-M1 from Bob then TTP will send DR-M2 to Alice and DR-M3 to Bob. The 
reason for sending DR-M2 to Alice even Bob is the one who raises dispute is to ensure fairness for both 
Alice and Bob. 
b. If the TTP receives incorrect DR-M1 from Bob then the TTP will not send DR-M2. 
Non-repudiation: it means that the party cannot falsely deny the transaction. The proposed protocol provides non-
repudiation of receipt. That is, Bob cannot deny that he has not signed the receipt sent in message EM2 because the 
receipt is signed using Bob's private key. Non-repudiation of origin is not supported in the proposed protocol as it is 
optional in certified email protocols [7]. However, if we need to provide it then message EM1 should include Alice's 
signature on the email. 
4. Comparison  
In the following, the comparison between our protocol and related protocols is presented. As can be seen in Table 1, our 
protocol and Micali's protocol [9] has the lowest number of messages in the exchange sub-protocol with only three 
messages. All protocols have three messages in the dispute sub-protocol. Regarding the number of modular 
exponentiations which is considered to be the most expensive operation [1], our protocol has the lowest number of 
modular exponentiations in the exchange sub-protocol with only six. In the dispute sub-protocol, our protocol and Micali's 
protocol [9] have the highest number of modular exponentiations with three. 
Table 1. Protocols Comparisons 
 Micali 
protocol [9] 
Nenadic et al 
Protocol [12] 
Puigserver et al 
Protocol [15] 
Our protocol 
# messages in the exchange sub-protocol 3 4 4 3 
# messages in the dispute sub-protocol 3 3 3 3 
# modular exponentiations in exchange 
protocol  
 
7 14 9 6 
# modular exponentiations in dispute 
resolution protocol  
 
3 2 2 
 
3 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, a new fair certified email protocol was proposed. The proposed protocol is based on offline TTP that will only 
be involved if one party misbehaved. The protocol comprises of only three messages in the exchange sub-protocol and 
three messages in the recovery sub-protocol. The approach used to design the protocol is based on verifiable and 
recoverable encryption of keys. The use of this approach resulted in having less number of messages and also less 
number of modular exponentiations comparing with other certified email protocols. 
The future work will include formal verification of the proposed protocol and implementing it. 
References  
1. Alaraj, A. (2012). Simple and Efficient Contract Signing Protocol. International Journal of Advanced Computer 
Science and Applications (IJACSA), Vol. 3, No. 3, 67-71. 
2. Abadi, M., Glew, N., Home, B. & Pinkas, B. (2002). Certified email with a light on-line trusted third party: design 
and implementation. In Proceedings of the International World Wide Web Conference –WWW ’02, ACM Press, 
New York, USA, 387–395. 
3. Bahreman, A. & Tygar, J. (1994). Certified electronic mail. In Proceedings of the 1994 Network and Distributed 
Systems Security Conference, February 1994, 3-19. 
      ISSN 22773061 
          
1260 | P a g e                                     J u l y  2 5 ,  2 0 1 3  
4. Basagiannis, S., Petridou, S., Alexiou, N., Papadimitriou, G., & Katsaros, P. (2011). Quantitative analysis of a 
certified e-mail protocol in mobile environments: A probabilistic model   checking approach. computers & security, 
30,  257-272. 
5. Ben-Or, M., Goldreich, O., Micali, S. & Rivest, R. (1990). A fair protocol for signing contracts. IEEE Transactions 
on Information Theory, vol. 36, no. 1, 40-46.  
6. Blum, M. (1983). How to exchange (secret) Keys, ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 1(2), 175–193. 
7. Ferrer-Gomillaa, J., Onievab, J., Payerasa, M., & Lopezb. J. (2010). Certified electronic mail: Properties revisited. 
computers & security 29,  167–179. 
8. Markowitch, O. & Roggeman, Y. (1999). Probabilistic non-repudiation without trusted third party. In Proceedings 
of the Second Conference on Security in Communication Networks – SCN ’99, 
9. Micali, S. (2003). Simple and fast optimistic protocols for fair electronic exchange. In Proceedings of the twenty-
second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing, PODC '03, July 13-16, 2003, Boston, 
Massachusetts, 12-19. 
10. Nenadic, A., Zhang, N. & Barton, S. (2004). A security protocol for certified e-goods delivery. In Proceedings of 
the IEEE International Conference on Information Technology, Coding and Computing –ITCC ’04, IEEE 
Computer Society, 22–28. 
11. Nenadic, A., Zhang, N. & Barton, S. (2004). Fair certified e-mail delivery. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium 
on Applied Computing – SAC ’04, 391–396. 
12. Nenadić, A., Zhang, N., Shi, Q. (2005). RSA-based Verifiable and Recoverable Encryption of Signatures and its 
application in certified e-mail delivery. Journal of Computer Security 13 (5) IOS Press, 757–777. 
13. Onieva, J., Zhou, J., Lopez, J. (2004). Enhancing certified email service for timeliness and multicast. In Fourth 
international network conference, 327–335. 
14. Oppliger, R. (2004). Certified mail: the next challenge for secure messaging. ACM Press. Communications of the 
ACM, 75–79. 
15. Puigserver, M., Gomila, J., Rotger, L. (2005). Certified e-mail protocol with verifiable third party. In Proceedings of 
the 2005 IEEE international conference on e-technology, e-commerce and eservice, EEE ’05, 548–551. 
16. Rivest, R., Shamir, A. & Adleman, L. (19787). A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key 
cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, vol. 21, no. 2, 120 –126. 
17. Shao, M., Wang, G., Zhou, J. (2006). Some common attacks against certified email protocols and the 
countermeasures. Computer Communications (29), 2759–2769.  
 
